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RicHARD ALBERT 
The unamendable core of the 
United States Constitution* 
Introduction 
In a series of earlier Articles on the structure of constitutional amendment, I have taken 
the position, which I hold still today, that unamendability poses significant challenges 
to democratic constitutionalism. The concept of unamendability, which refers to a 
formally entrenched provision or an informally entrenched norm that prohibits an 
alteratiol). or violation of that provision or norm, raises fundamental questions in 
constitutional law implicating sovereignty, legitimacy, democracy and the rule of 
law.1 In my view, unamendability undermines the basic promise of democratic 
constitutionalism because it limits the universe of constitutional possibilities open to 
those whom the constitution govems.2 Unamendability, I have argued, withholds from 
citizens 'more than a mere procedural right' to amend the constitution; it 'hijack[s] their 
most basic of all democratic rights' .3 I have also suggested that constitutional rigidity 
becomes a defect where it makes amendment impossible, 4 and I have illustrated how 
unamendability confers upon courts disproportionately vast powers in comparison to 
those exercised by coordinate branches. 5 
As a matter of constitutional theory, I therefore resist unamendability as a 
democratically legitimate constitutional design. But I have often wondered whether 
I could on any practical basis justify some form of unamendability, however limited, as 
a necessary feature of democratic constitutional design. After all, all rules admit of 
exceptions, especially in law where the justification for an exception often strengthens 
the need for a rule of general application. In much the same way, I wonder whether 
a strong proceduralist committed to democratic first principles could conceivably, even 
if r~luctantly, find value in the political utility of a particular manifestation of 
unamendability while nonetheless defending a general rule against it. 
* The author extends his sincere thanks to Or Bassok, Laurie Claus, Joel Col6n-Rios, Yaniv Roznai, and 
Alex Tsesis for comments on earlier drafts of his article appearing in this volume. 
1 Richard Albert, 'NonconstitutionalAmendments' (2009) 22 Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence 
5, 9-10. 
2 Richard Albert, 'Counterconstitutionalism' (2008) 31 Dalhousie Law Journal1, 47-48. 
3 Richard Albert, 'Constitutional Handcuffs' (2010) 42 Arizona State Law Journal663, 698. 
4 Richard Albert, 'Constructive Unamendability in Canada and the United States' (2014) 67(2) Supreme 
Court Law Review (2d) 181, 186. 
5 Richard Albert, 'Amending Constitutional Amendment Rules' (2015) 13 International Journal of 
Constitutional Law [forthcoming]. 
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this Article, I inquire whether the United States is one such example. I ask 
specifically whether anything should be regarded as unamendable the United States 
but I pose the question in a particular way. The question I wish to explore is narrow 
important, and it requires constraining the parameters of the inquiry order to force an 
answer at a very low level of abstraction rather than to satisfy ourselves with an answer 
that remains at a high level of theory. 
My objective is to ask whether the United States Constitution should require some 
form of unamendability, either explicit or implicit, in order to survive according to 
its own terms. I conclude that the Constitution may indeed require the Implicit 
unamendability of the First Amendment's protections for democratic expression, 6 which 
I suggest forms the unamendable core of the United States Constitution. I also inquire 
into the capacity of courts to enforce unamendability in the United States, and I suggest 
in closing that unamendability may be more effective as an expressive declaration of 
importance than as a referent for judicial enforceability. 
I note, before proceeding, that my choice to focus exclusively on the United States 
Constitution is driven by both prudence and what I perceive to be necessity. One could 
certainly advance the claim that democratic expression is an unamendable core of all 
democratic constitutions, and proceed then to draw from bills of rights around the world 
to build the case that democratic expression, even where it is not absolutely entrenched, 
should be unamendable. But I prefer to approach the comparative enterprise with 
modesty in the face of real differences in the constitutional traditions that underpin 
constitutional texts, particularly where, as here, the task is to evaluate what holds 
foundational yet particularised importance in a given constitutional regime. 7 
democratic objection unamendability 
A formally unamendable constitutional provision, also known as an eternity, perpetuity 
or entrenchment clause, is impervious to formal amendment, even with supermajority 
or unanimous agreement from the political actors whose consent is required to alter the 
constitutional text. 8 Formal unamendability was once rare but it is now increasingly 
6 It is worth considering whether the First Amendment was a mere 'amendment' or whether it amounted 
to a 'revision' that transformed the United States Constitution, as did the Fourteenth Amendment. See Akhil 
Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights: Creation and Reconstruction (Yale University Press 1998) 288-94. On my 
reading, the First Amendment made explicit the democratic values of self-government that were already 
embedded in the Constitution. See Alexander Meiklejohn, 'The First Amendment is an Absolute' (1961) 
Supreme Court Law Review 245, 252. 
7 A further reason that compels caution in too quickly generalising across jurisdictions is the 
extraordinary difficulty of formally amending the United States Constitution as compared to other national 
constitutions. See Donald S Lutz, Principles of Constitutional Design (CUP 2006) 170. 
8 Of course, no constitutional provision, not even an unamendable one, can survive revolution. See 
Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Parliamentary Sovereignty (CUP 2010) 70. For a recent illustration of the limited 
constraining force of formal unamendability in the face of violent change, see Yaniv Roznai and Silvia 
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common in modem constitutions. From 1789 to 1944, no more than 20 percent of all 
new constitutions entrenched formal unamendability, as compared to 25 percent 
between 1945 and 1988, and over 50 percent from 1989 to 2013.9 Unamendability 
need not always be formal. Unamendability may also be informal, a phenomenon that 
poses its own challenges. In this Part, I distinguish between formal and informal 
unamendability, and I evaluate their consequences for democratic constitutionalism. 
The purposes of formal unamendability 
Although nothing in the United States Constitution is today formally unamendable, the 
Constitution entrenches two expired examples of formal unamendability as well as a 
current example of constructive unamendability. Constructive unamendability refers to 
a constitutional provision that is unamendable not as a result of constitutional design 
but as a result of the present political climate that makes it today practically unlikely, 
despite being theoretically possible and perhaps even practically possible in the future, 
to gather the required majorities to amend it using the constitution's formal amendment 
rules. 10 It is therefore not unamendable by virtue of a textual rule against its amendment. 
The Equal Suffrage Clause, for example, guarantees that 'no State, without its Consent, 
shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate'. 11 It is constructively unamendable 
because no state would today agree to a diminution in its representation in the Senate. 
Constructive unamendability is not my focus in this Article. 
Formal unamendability, in contrast, effectively disables a constitution's formal 
amendment rules. It refers to one or more provisions in the constitutional text that are 
expressly designated as unalterable under the formal amendment rules. Constitutional 
designers can make anything unamendable: a principle, rule, value, structure, symbol or 
institution. 12 Absolutely entrenching something against amendment creates a distinction 
between it and a freely amendable constitutional provision, signalling the greater 
relative significance of the provision that has been shielded from formal amendment. 13 
The United States Constitution entrenches a now-expired temporary form of formal 
unameridability in the following clause of its amendment rule in Article V: 'Provided 
that no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred 
Suteu, 'The Eternal Territory? The Crimean Crisis and Ukraine's Territorial Integrity as an Unamendable 
Constitutional Principle' (2015) 16 German Law Journal 542. My inquiry here is limited to continuous 
constitutional change governed internally by amendment rules. · 
9 See Yaniv Roznai, 'Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments: A Study of the Nature and Limits 
of Constitutional Amendment Powers' ch 2, 28 (unpublished dissertation on file with author). 
10 Richard Albert, 'Constitutional Disuse or Desuetude' (2014) 94 Boston University Law Review 1029, 
1043. 
11 US Const, art V (1789). 
12 On the structure of unamendable provisions, see Yaniv Roznai, 'Unamendability and the Genetic 
Code of the Constitution' (20 15) European Review of Public Law [forthcoming] 
13 Lech Garlicki and Zofia A Garlicka, 'External Review of Constitutional Amendments? International 
Law as a Norm of Reference' (2011) 44 Israel Law Review 343, 349. 
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eight any Manner affect the first Clauses Section 
the Article' .14 The first and fourth clauses of Article I, Section 9 were formally 
from the moment of the coming-into-force of 1789 
1808. Article I, Section 9, Clause 1 authorised states to move 
Article 1, Section 9, Clause 4 guaranteed 
based. 15 Both clauses formed part of the Constitution's institutionalised "h-nrna•-.."rrr-.. ... lr 
the protection of slavery. 16 These two formally unamendable provisions were necessary 
the slave holding states to approve ratify the Constitution. authors 
Constitution entrenched these slave trade protections as temporarily unamendable 
the year 1808 with the objective of later returning to the subject twenty years to 
reconsider it 'with less difficulty and greater coolness' .17 
These two now-expired temporarily unamendable slave trade clauses reflect one of 
the five purposes of formal amendability: to secure a constitutional bargain. 18 Where 
political actors reach an impasse on a divisive question of constitutional design, they 
may choose to make a resolution formally unamendable only for a defined period of 
time or they may alternatively opt to make an enduring compromise formally 
unamendable, a constitutional design choice that frees them to deal with other matters 
of basic governmental structure and function. 19 The use of formal unamendability to 
secure a constitutional bargain is appropriate for temporary agreements that political 
actors may choose to revisit after the constitution has been given time to take root in 
the political culture. 20 It is not uncommon, for instance, for new constitutions to 
prohibit formal amendments for a fixed number of years immediately upon their 
ratification.21 
Formal unamendability may also be deployed for a second purpose: to preserve a 
core feature of the self-identity of the state. This preservative function ofunamendability 
privileges one or more constitutional principles, rules, values, structures or institutions 
as fundamentally constitutive of the regime. Preservative unamendability reflects the 
14 ibid. 
15 US Const, art I,§ 9, ell; US Const, art I,§ 9, cl4. 
16 Jamal Greene, 'Originalism's Race Problem' (2011) 88 Denver University Law Review 517, 518-19. 
17 Douglas Linder, 'What in the Constitution Cannot Be Amended?' (1981) 23 Arizona Law Review 
717, 721. 
18 Rosalind Dixon and Tom Ginsburg, 'Deciding Not to Decide: Deferral in Constitutional Design' 
(2011) 9 International Journal of Constitutional Law 636, 644. One can understand unamendability in this 
respect as a 'gag rule' that silences debate on matters of contention. See Stephen Holmes, 'Gag Rules or the 
Politics of Omission' in Jon Elster and Rune Slagstad ( eds), Constitutionalism and Democracy (CUP 1993) 
19-58. 
19 For more on temporary unamendability in the United States and elsewhere, see Ozan 0 Varol, 
'Temporary Constitutions' (2014) 102 California Law Review 409, 439-48. 
2° For an analysis of the forms of temporal restrictions on formal amendment, see Richard Albert, 'The 
Structure of Constitutional Amendment Rules' (2014) 49 Wake Forest Law Review 913, 952-54. 
21 See eg Cape Verde Const, pt VI, tit III, art 309(1) (1980) (prohibiting formal amendments for five 
years following ratification of the constitution). 
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judgment of the drafting generation that the unamendable feature is important at the 
time of the adoption of the constitution and that successor generations should respect 
the sacredness of both this founding judgment and the entrenched feature itself. 
Constitutional states entrench many examples of preservative unamendability. For 
. example, Brazil and Germany both make federalism unamendable as a way both of 
preserving a governmental structure that has historically been necessary to manage 
conflict and disagreement, and of recognizing its centrality to political life.22 We can 
likewise interpret the absolute entrenchment of an official religion, or indeed of 
secularism, as an expression of the importance of religion or non-religion in that 
constitutional regime, either as a reflection only of the views of the constitutional 
drafters or of the views of citizens as well, or indeed both. Algeria and Iran make 
Islam unamendable as the official state religion, whereas Portugal and Turkey establish 
secularism as an unamendable feature of the state.23 Both reflect a founding value 
intended to be preserved. 
In contrast to its preservative function, formal unamendability may also be used 
to transform a state. This is a third purpose of unamendability. Transformational 
unamendability seeks to repudiate something about the past and to adopt a new 
operating principle that will shape and inform a new constitutional identity.24 This is 
sometimes more of an aspiration than a justiciable commitment, but it nevertheless 
serves to express a constitutional value deemed important enough by the authoring 
generation to make it unremovable from the constitutional text. Transformational 
entrenchment is intended to reflect the state's commitment to pursuing the values served 
by the entrenched constitutional provision and to urge respect for the entrenched 
provision by present and future political actors, present and future citizens, as well as 
present and future external actors. 
Constitutional states entrench many examples of transformational unamendability. 
For exarnple, under the new Bosnian and Herzegovinian Constitution, all civil and 
political rights are formally unamendable,25 in contrast to the regime that predated 
the new constitution.26 The Ukrainian Constitution today likewise makes all rights 
unamendable,27 something that would have been unimaginable before the new 
constitution came into force. 28 As a final illustration, consider the Namibian Constitution, 
22 Albert (n 2) 679. 
23 Compare Algeria Const, tit IV, art 178(3) (1989), Iran Const, art 177 (1980), with Portugal Const, pt 
IV, tit II, art 288(c) (1976), Turkey Const, pt I, art 4 (1982). 
24 For useful illustrations of the use of unamendability as a transformative device in Germany, India, 
and South Africa, see Gabor Halmai, 'Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments: Constitutional Courts 
· as Guardians of the Constitution?' (2012) 19 Constellations 182, 183-88, 190-91. 
25 Bosnia and Herzegovina Const, art X, para 2 (1995). 
26 Anna Morawiec Mansfield, :Ethnic But Equal: The Quest for a New Democratic Order in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina' (2003) 103 Columbia Law Review 2052, 2056. 
27 Ukraine Const, tit XIII, art 157 (1996). 
28 Richard CO Rezie, 'The Ukrainian Constitution: Interpretation of the Citizens' Rights Provisions' 
( 1999) 31 Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 169, 17 5-81. 
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which makes rights and liberties unamendable,29 also in contrast to its own problematic 
past infringements on rights.30 These examples suggest how formal unamendability 
may be used to help transform a state's default posture from rights infringement to 
rights enforcement.31 Although formal unamendability cannot by itself defend rights 
from abuse, it can express the significance that constitutional designers attribute to 
rights enforcement along with their hope that their successors will ultimately and 
durably agree. 
Fourth, formal unamendability may be a reconciliatory device. The purpose of 
reconciliatory unamendability is to achieve peace by absolving factions and their 
leaders of criminal or civil wrongdoing in an effort to move past conflict and discord. 
For example, reconciliatory unamendability is illustrated by a formally unamendable 
grant of amnesty or immunity for prior conduct leading to a coup or an attempted one. 
By conferring amnesty upon political actors, constitutional designers seek to avoid a 
contentious and potentially destabilizing criminal or civil prosecution of wrongdoers by 
putting prosecution off the table altogether. The goal is instead to allow opposing 
factions to start afresh, free from threat of legal action, and sometimes in tandem with a 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission to give victims the opportunity to air their views 
and to record their memories but without invoking the consequence of legal duty and 
violation.32 An example of reconciliatory unamendability is the now-superseded 1999 
Constitution of Niger, which entrenched an unamendable amnesty provision for those 
involved in two coups-on 27 January 1996 and 9 April1999-in order to give the new 
constitutional settlement a chance to succeed without the looming threat of the 
governing party prosecuting the opposition for earlier acts. 33 
The fifth purpose of unamendability is related to each of the other purposes: to 
express constitutional values. Where a constitutional text distinguishes one provision 
by making it immune to the formal amendment rules that ordinarily apply, the message 
both conveyed and perceived is that this provision is more highly valued than those not 
granted the same protection. 34 Whether or not the absolute entrenchment of a given 
provision is intended to be enforceable, unamendability is nevertheless an important 
statement about the value, either objective or subjective or both, of the provision to that 
constitutional community. It is the ultimate expression of importance that can be 
communicated by the constitutional text. For example, the Cuban Constitution's 
absolute entrenchment of socialism is a statement of the importance of socialism, 35 just 
29 NamibiaConst, chXIX, art 131 (1990). 
30 Adrien Katherine Wing, 'Communitarianism vs. Individualism: Constitutionalism in Namibia and 
South Africa' (1993) 11 Wisconsin International Law Journa/295, 337-44. 
31 Albert (n 2) 685-87. 
32 ibid 693-98. 
33 Niger Const, tit XII, art 136 (1999) (superseded); Niger Const, tit XII, art 141 (1999) (superseded). 
34 Richard Albert, 'The Expressive Function of Constitutional Amendment Rules' (2013) 59 McGill 
Law Journa/225, 254. 
35 Cuba Const, s 3 (1976) (as amended in 2002). 
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as the Afghan Constitution's absolute entrencp_ment of Islam and Islamic Republicanism 
reflect its highest constitutional values,36 according to the authors of these constitutions. 
The expressive purpose of unamendability differs from its transformational purpose, 
the latter entailing a temporally-prior social or political referent that the unamendability 
s~eks to repudiate. The expressive purpose need not necessarily reflect a repudiation of 
the past; it may instead reflect altogether new values without reference to an old or 
superseded constitutional order or text. 
The roots of informal unamendability 
As illustrated by these examples, unamendability generally derives from its formal 
entrenchment in a constitutional text. But unamendability may also derive inf0rmally 
from judicial interpretation. Where the constitutional text does not expressly immunise 
a constitutional provision from formal amendment, a court may, in its own interpretation 
of the constitutional text, identify either a written provision or an unwritten principle as 
implicitly entrenched against formal amendment. Although the forms ofunamendability 
differ in these two cases-in the former, the text entrenches unamendability, and in the 
latter, the court imposes it-the result is indistinguishable insofar as both forms of 
unamendability bind political actors in that constitutional regime. There is therefore 
little functional difference between the informal unamendability that judges interpret 
and the formal unamendability that constitutional designers affirmatively choose to 
entrench in the text. Both forms of unamendability may serve the same five functional 
purposes. 
Informal unamendability is rooted in the distinction between formal amendment and 
revision. 37 Both are types of constitutional change, though only the former preserves 
legal continuity in the regime. Formal amendment authorises alterations to the 
constitutional text 'only under the presupposition that the identity and continuity of the 
constitution as an entirety is preserved' .38 An amendment may therefore delete, refine or 
add to the text provided that it does not 'offend the spirit or the principles' of the 
constitution. 39 It must, in other words, be consistent with the existing constitution and 
must 'preserve the constitution itself'. 40 Perhaps the best way to conceptualise an 
36 Afghanistan Const, art 149 (2003). 
37 It is important to recognise that there is no consensus on the terminology used to refer to this 
distinction. Indeed some national constitutions use the term 'revision' to refer to amendment. See eg France 
Const, tit XIV, art 89 (1958); Japan Const, ch IX, art 96 (1947). The concept of 'revision' may alternatively 
be referred to as 'total reform' or 'replacement' and there are also many variations in the terms used to refer 
to an 'amendment', namely 'partial reform' or 'reform'. The point is to draw a distinction between major 
and minor consequences of textual alteration. 
38 Carl Schmitt, Constitutional Theory (Jeffrey Seitzer transl, ed, Duke University Press 2008) 150. 
39 ibid 153. 
40 ibid 150. 
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.lLJLU_V.Jl.lL.._.i.llJlV.ll-l<- or 
to presidential system.44 contrast, is more VVJUU-lJ._._V_. _ _._.Jl 
to refer to narrow, non-transfonnative alterations, for instance a change 
the installation of the head of government from March to January a given year.45 
Distinguishing amendment from revision requires a theory about what in a given 
constitution is fundamental. Some constitutional texts clearly express their non-
negotiable values somewhere in the constitutional text, whether in the preamble or 
elsewhere.46 We can infer from these values what kinds of changes would fall within the 
permissible scope of the amendment power and which may be changed only by 
invoking the more elaborate and participatory process that revision requires.47 Still, the 
41 Jason Mazzone, 'Unamendments' (2005) 90 Iowa Law Review 1747, 1776. 
42 Thomas M Cooley, 'The Power to Amend the Federal Constitution' (1893) 2(4) Michigan Law 
Journall09, 118. 
43 Peter Suber, The Paradox of Self-Amendment (Peter Lang Publishing 1990) 18-20. 
44 Note that it is in theory possible for a change labell~d as a 'revision' to preserve the identity of the 
constitution while a change labelled as an 'amendment' could on its own transform the entire framework of 
government. 
45 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (Columbia University Press 1996); Walter F Murphy, Constitutional 
Democracy: Creating and Maintaining a Just Political Order (Johns Hopkins University Press 2007) 498 n 
4. In the United States, the Twentieth Amendment changed the date of presidential installation from 4 March 
to 20 January. See US Const, amend XX (1933). 
46 See eg Angola Const, prmbl (2008); Kazakhstan Const, art 1(1) (1995); Paraguay Const, prmbl 
(1992); South Africa Const, s 1 (1996); Spain Const, s 1 (1978); Zambia Const, prmbl (1991). 
47 One might well wonder, as Alex Tsesis suggested to me in an earlier exchange, whether the preamble 
to the United States Constitution could or should be regarded as unamendable. The Supreme Court, in 1905, 
suggested that the preamble is non-justiciable but said nothing about its amendability: 
Although that Preamble indicates the general purposes for which the people ordained and established 
the Constitution, it has never been regarded as the source of any substantive power conferred on the 
Government of the United States or on any of its Departments. Such powers embrace only those 
expressly granted in the body of the Constitution and such as may be implied from those so granted. 
Although, therefore, one of the declared objects of the Constitution was to secure the blessings of 
liberty to all under the sovereign jurisdiction and authority of the United States, no power can be 
exerted to that end by the United States unless, apart from the Preamble, it be found in some express 
delegation of power or in some power to be properly implied therefrom. 
Jacobson v Massachusetts, [1905] 197 US 11, 22. 
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distinction between amendment and revision remains largely theoretical.48 Whether a 
given change amounts to an amendment or a revision is often if not always contestable. 
In the United States, the Constitution's fundamental norms and self-identity are 
debatable.49 The Constitution does not reveal in its text what is 'most' important; all 
constitutional provisions are today freely formally amendable. Yet even if ~e posited 
that one norm was implicitly unamendable, reasonable observers could disagree about 
which one holds that special status. 50 And even if we could somehow agree on that front, 
we might still disagree on how to interpret the scope of the norm that holds special 
status, be it the freedom of expression, the separation of powers, or something else. 
Although the distinction between amending and revising a constitution appears 
nowhere in the text of the United States Constitution, it is well rooted in the American 
state constitutional tradition. 51 The California Constitution is a useful illustration of a 
state constitution distinguishing between an amendment and a revision. The text 
acknowledges the distinction in recognising both amendment and revision,52 but 
California courts have had to elaborate its meaning. As early as 1894, the Supreme 
Court of California defined an amendment as 'such an addition or change within the 
lines of the original instrument as will effect an improvement, or better carry out the 
purpose for which it was framed.' 53 A revision, on the other hand, is a 'far reaching 
change in the nature and operation of our governmental structure'54 or that 'substantially 
alter[ s] the basic governmental framework set forth in our Constitution. ' 55 More 
recently, the California Supreme Court reaffirmed that a constitutional revision is a 
'fundamental change in the basic governmental plan or framevvork established by the 
pre-existing provisions of the California Constitution. ' 56 Other state courts have 
interpreted the ·distinction in a similar fashion. 57 But federal courts in the United States 
have yet to interpret the United States Constitution consistent with this distinction. 
48 But some constitutions make explicit the distinction between amendment and revision, or between a 
partial and total revision, by requiring political actors to satisfy different procedures for each. See eg Austria 
Const, ch ll, art 44(3) (1920); Spain Const, pt X, arts 166-68 (1978); Switzerland Const, tit VI, ch 1, arts 
192-95 (1999) . 
. 
49 Laurence H Tribe, 'A Constitution We Are Amending: In Defense of a Restrained Judicial Role' 
(1983) 97 Harvard Law Review 433,440. 
50 Melissa Schwartzberg, Democracy and Legal Change (CUP 2007) 148. 
51 Gerald Benjamin, 'Constitutional Amendment and Revision' in GAlan Tarr and Robert F Williams 
(eds), State Constitutions for the Twenty-First Century, Vol 3: The Agenda of State Constitutional Reform 
(State University of New York Press 2006) 178 (noting that 23 state constitutions expressly reference the 
term 'revision'). 
52 California Const, art XVIII, paras 1-4 (1879). 
53 Livermore v Waite, [1894] 102 Cal113, 118-19 (Cal). 
54 Amador Valley Joint Union High School District v State Board of Equalization, [1978] 22 Cal 3d 
208, 221 (Cal). 
55 Legislature v Eu, [1991] 54 Cal 3d 492, 510 :(Cal). 
56 Strauss v Horton, [2009] 46 Cal 4th 364, 441-42 (Cal). 
57 See eg Bess v Ulmer, [1999] 985 P 2d 979, 982 (Alaska); Adams v Gunter, Jr, [1970] 238 So 2d 824, 
829-30 (Fla); In re Opinion to the Governor, [1935] 178 A 433, 439 (RI). 
22 Comparative Perspectives on the Fundamental Freedom of Expression 
the text does not express its non-negotiable constitutional values nor does 
it entrench formal rules entrenching unamendability, judges may the course of 
interpreting constitution designate a provision, principle, rule, structure or institution 
as unamendable. The prompt for courts to declare something unamendable is commonly, 
though not always, a formal amendment that political actors have duly passed into law 
in conformity with the procedures entrenched in the constitutional text. A party then 
argues in court that the formal amendment violates a constitutional norm, either written 
or unwritten, the result being that the formal amendment, although having satisfied the 
textual :strictures for amending the constitution, comes under judicial review for its 
constitutionality. The possibility of an unconstitutional constitutional amendment may 
be a difficult concept to understand since the very basis of the formal rule of law is to 
legitimate the actions of political actors who successfully adhere to and execute fair 
legal rules. 58 But courts around the world are increasingly embracing the idea of an 
unconstitutional constitutional amendment, with subscribers in one form or another in 
Brazil, the Czech Republic, Germany, India, Italy, South Africa, Turkey and elsewhere. 59 
The Indian Supreme Court illustrates how courts may use· the distinction between 
amendment and revision to informally entrench something as unamendable. In India, 
the text of the Constitution establishes no limits on the formal amendment power; 
no subject-matter is off limits, be it federalism, republicanism, secularism or human 
rights. 60 Nor does the text of the Constitution contemplate the possibility of an 
unconstitutional constitutional amendment. Yet today, the Supreme Court possesses the 
power to invalidate a duly passed constitutional amendment for violating the 'basic 
structure' of the Constitution, a doctrine the Court has created by judicial interpretation.61 
The 'basic structure doctrine' reflects the distinction between amendment and revision 
insofar as it establishes a judicially enforceable limit on the kinds of constitutional 
changes that political actors may make using the procedures of formal amendment. 
According to the Court, formal amendment is appropriate for constitutional changes 
that respect the internal architecture of the Indian Constitution because 'in the result 
the basic foundation and structure of the Constitution remains the same.' 62 But where 
a constitutional change would violate the basic foundation and structure of the 
Constitution-for example, a change to constitutional supremacy, democracy, and 
the separation of powers-formal_ amendment is inappropriate. Changes to these 
fundamental features of Indian constitutionalism must instead occur via revision, which 
effectively entails the adoption of a new constitution, or at the very least the recognition 
and accompanying validation by special amendment procedures that the constitutional 
58 Vincent J Samar, 'Can a Constitutional Amendment Be Unconstitutional' (2008) 33 Oklahoma City 
University Law Re-View 667, 694-95. 
59 See Yaniv Roznai, 'Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments: The Migration and Success of a 
Constitutional Idea' (2013) 61 American Journal of Comparative Law 657, 676-713. 
60 India Const, pt XX, art 36 (1950). 
61 Granville Austin, Working a Democratic Constitution: The Indian Experience (OUP 1999) 197-202. 
62 Kesavananda Bharati v State of Kerala, [1973] 4 SCC 225, 366 (Sikri, CJ). 
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transformation is extraordinary. 63 The Court has therefore given itself the role of 
enforcing the distinction between amendment and' revision. In India, as in other 
countries that have adopted the doctrine of unconstitutional constitutional amendments,64 
the power of formal amendment is limited-even where the text entrenches no 
substantive limit on how, whether or when political actors may formally amend the 
constitution. 
The consequences of unamendability 
The prevalence of formal and informal unamendability should not be used as a 
shorthand to defend its legitimacy. There is good reason to resist, or at the very 
least to question, unamendability in both formal constitutional design and 
informal constitutional evolution, particularly from the perspective of democratic 
constitutionalism, which I take to require the continuing right of political actors and 
citizens to redefine themselves through their constitution. 
Exercising the right to constitutional amendment requires more than having the 
nominal right to change the constitutional text by formal alteration or informal 
evolution. Anchored in the values of participatory democracy, the right to constitutional 
amendment is the product of prior rights in democratic constitutionalism, including the 
right to adequate and equal opportunities for participating in public debate, voting 
equality, informed citizenship and deliberative procedures, as well as the right to 
effective representation. 65 Unamendability undermines each of these. It disables public 
discourse as to the unamendable matter, dilutes the vote of present and future 
generations as compared to the entrenc?ing generation, negates informed citizenship 
and devalues deliberation, and denies effective representation to the constitutionally-
bound generation. 
The effect of unamendability, then, is problematic for democratic constitutionalism. 
Not only does unamendability presuppose perfection in the design and interpretation of 
the constitutional text, 66 it also stifles democratic innovation and the collective learning 
that may persuade present and future generations of the desirability of departing from 
63 ibid. 
64 One of the most recent jurisdictions to adopt the doctrine of unconstitutional constitutional amendment 
is Belize. See British Caribbean Bank Limited v Attorney General of Belize, [2012] Claim No 597 of 2011, 
online: <http:/ /www.belizejudiciary.org/web/supreme _ court/judgements/legal20 12/ eighth%20amendment. 
pdf> (invalidating portions of duly-passed constitutional amendment); Barry M Bowen v Attorney General 




65 Robert A Dalh, Toward Democracy: A Journey (University of California Press 1997) 61-68. 
66 Schwartzberg (n 50) 202-203. 
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democratic self-government, 71 
disjunction between the founding values vJU.l,.l 'Vl.l.'V.LJL'VU. 
actual values that may later evolve to define 
which is the product of a people constituting reconstituting itself, 72 
from the promise that the social contract which 
and their governors is to remain a living one whose terms are neither static nor 
unreflective of the contemporary views of the polity dynamic, receptive 
to new influences, and also adaptable to modem social contexts. 
The democratic objection to unamendability may be grave but it is not to the claim 
that nothing in the United States Constitution should be unamendable. Although no 
textual provision in the Constitution today remains formally unamendable nor has the 
Supreme Court interpreted the Constitution as implicitly requiring any provision or 
norm to be informally unamendable, unamendability may nonetheless be a condition 
precedent to democracy in the United States. Indeed one could argue that the democratic 
roots of the United States Constitution require some form of unamendability, however 
modest, if the Constitution, which is rooted the concept of popular sovereignty, is to 
remain internally coherent on its own terms. In this Part, I advance a limited theory of 
democratic unamendability in the United States. I suggest that the First Amendment's 
protections for the exercise of de1nocratic rights could be deemed unamendable and a 
necessary corollary ofthe Constitution's promise of robust democracy. 
67 ibid 197. 
68 ibid 200. 
69 Donald P Kommers, 'The Basic Law: A Fifty Year Assessment' (2000) 53 SMU Law Review 477, 479. 
70 One example of a problematic form ofunamendability is the Honduran Constitution's prohibition on 
even proposing changes to the unamendable single-tenn limit for presidents. See Honduras Const, tit V, ch 
VI, art 239 (1982). 
71 Edward L Rubin, 'Getting Past Democracy' (2001) 149 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 
711, 731. 
72 Martin Loughlin, The Idea of Public Law (OUP 2003) 113. 
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contestability fundamental values 
Although, as a descriptive matter, neither the Constitution's text nor its interpretation 
makes anything unamendable, scholars have argued that certain features of the United 
States Constitution should as a normative matter be considered unamendable. Yet 
scholars do not agree on precisely what should be unamendable in the United States. 
For example, Walter Murphy has written that human dignity, though it is mentioned 
nowhere in the constitutional text, is an unamendable constitutional value.73 Similarly, 
Bruce Ackerman has proposed that the entire Bill of Rights should be made 
unamendable. 74 Others, like Corey Brettschneider and Jeff Rosen, have contended 
respectively that the Eighth Amendment75 and natural rights 76 should be regarded as 
unamendable despite there being no rule against their formal amendment in the 
Constitution. Still others, for instance Miriam Galston and David Harmer, have 
suggested respectively that religious liberty77 and the Second Amend1nenf8 should be 
treated as implicitly unamendable even though the United States Constitution does not 
designate either, or anything else, as expressly unamendable. 
The contestability of fundamental values derives from reasonable disagreement 
about the core features of the United States Constitution. The relative importance of 
constitutional norms is debatable and indeed so is the basic identity of the polity in the 
absence of any peremptory textual delineation of a hierarchy according to which we can 
reliably prioritise one norm over another. 79 Melissa Schwartzberg is therefore correct 
to respond to the inescapable scholarly disagreement on the relative importance of 
fundamental values that ' [ e ]fforts at restricting the boundaries of constitutional 
amendment are bound to be challengeable, and reasonable people are likely to disagree 
about what constitutes an unalterable principle' .80 It is a feature not a flaw of the 
73 Walter F Murphy, 'The Art of Constitutional Interpretation: A Preliminary Showing' in M Judd 
Harmon (ed), Essays on the Constitution of the United States (Kennikat Press 1978) 156. 
74 Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations (HUP 1991) 16. 
75 Corey Brettscheider, Democratic Rights: The Substance of Self-Government (PUP 2010) 156 . 
. 76 Jeff Rosen, 'Was the Flag Burning Amendment Unconstitutional?' (1991) 100 Yale Law Journal 
1073, 1084-89. 
77 Miriam Galston, 'Theocracy in America: Should Core First Amendment Values Be Permanent?' 
(2009) 37 Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly 65, 124. 
78 David Harmer, 'Securing a Free State: Why the Second Amendment Matters' (1998) BrigharYJ Young 
University Law Review 55, 77. 
79 Tribe (n 49). 
so Schwartzberg (n 50) 147. This is true also with respect to some formally unamendable constitutional 
provisions that are cast at a high level of abstraction. In these cases, it is reasonable to expect disagreement 
on the meaning of the absolutely entrenched provision and how it should be applied to police the conduct 
of political actors. For example, the German Basic Law makes 'human dignity' unamendable. See German 
Basic Law, tit I, art 1(1) (1949). The German Constitutional Court has interpreted this formally unamendable 
provision to require the state to protect pre-natal life over the mother's autonomy interest. See Donald P 
Kommers and Russell A Miller, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany (3rd 
edn, Duke University Press 20 12) 3 77 (translating, describing and discussing the Abortion I Case ( 197 5), 3 9 
BverfGE 1 ). It would not be unreasonable for others to disagree with that interpretation. 
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Constitution that its textual indeterminacy privileges no particular view because this 
tum preserves what Heather Gerken describes as 'the ongoing contestability of 
constitutional law'. 81 
In face of contestable claims about what should be unamendable, the Supreme 
Court of the United States has adopted a process-based approach to determining 
validity of a constitutional amendment. For the Supreme Court, the text of Article Vis 
the sole source of authority on the constitutionality of amendments. As long as an 
amendment adheres to the procedural strictures specified in Article V, it is valid and 
binding. The Court has at least twice declined to invalidate a constitutional amendment 
challenged as unconstitutional. 
One major instance involved the Eighteenth Amendment, which imposed 
prohibition. 82 In a series of cases before the Supreme Court, the Court dismissed 
arguments about the amendment's unconstitutionality, holding that the Eighteenth 
Amendment, '[b ]y lawful proposal and ratification, has become part of the Constitution, 
and must be respected and given effect the same as other provisions of that instrument. ' 83 
One class of arguments for invalidating the amendment concerned its intrusion into the 
scope of state police powers. 84 The second class of arguments turned on whether the 
amendment impermissibly authorised the federal government to interfere with the 
private lives of individuals. 85 Specifically, some argued that the amendment exceeded 
the power of government under Article V because the amendment was essentially a 
legislative act constraining the choices of individuals. 86 Others insisted that the 
amendment was an unconstitutional violation of the inalienable right to pursue 
happiness.87 None of these convinced the Court. The amendment was passed and 
ratified, and though it was ultimately repealed, 88 it was repealed via Article V itself, not 
as a result of a judicial declaration of its unconstitutionality. 
The Supreme Court also ruled on the Nineteenth Amendment, which granted women 
the right to vote. 89 Opponents of the measure argued that it was unconstitutional because 
81 Heather K Gerken, 'The Hydraulics of Constitutional Reform: A Skeptical Response to Our 
Undemocratic Constitution' (2007) 55 Drake Law Review 925, 937. 
82 US Canst, amend XVIII (1919). 
83 National Prohibition Cases, [1930] 253 US 350, 386. 
84 See eg Fred B Hart, 'The Amendatory Power Under the Constitution, Particularly With Reference 
to Amendment 18' (1920) 90 Central Law Journal229, 232; Robert Post, 'Federalism, Positive Law, and 
the Emergence of the American Administrative State: Prohibition in the Taft Court Era' (2006) 48 William 
& Mary Law Review 1, 48-49; George D Skinner, 'Intrinsic Limitations on the Power of Constitutional 
Amendment' (1919-1920) 18 Michigan Law Review 213, 219-21. 
85 Henry S Cohn and Ethan Davis, 'Stopping the Wind that Blows and the Rivers that Run: Connecticut 
and Rhode Island Reject the Prohibition Amendment' (2009) 27 Quinnipiac Law Review 327,272. 
86 Edward Hartnett, 'Why is the Supreme Court of the United States Protecting State Judges from 
Popular Democracy?' (1997) 75 Texas Law Review 907, 951. 
87 Everett V Abbot, 'Inalienable Rights and the Eighteenth Amendment' (1920) 20 Columbia Law 
Review 183, 185-87. 
88 US Canst, amend XXI (1933). 
89 US Canst, amend XIX (1920). 
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it divested non-ratifying states.oftheir power over the administration and regulation of 
elections.90 The Tenth Amendment, it was argued, was meant to guarantee that a state 
would not be deprived of that power.91 According' to critics, pushing through the 
amendment, and in the process violating the Tenth Amendment, was an unconstitutional 
displacement of sovereignty away from the states.92 The Supreme Court rejected these 
state sovereignty claims that the Nineteenth Amendment was unconstitutional: 'The 
argument is that so great an addition to the electorate, if made without the State's 
consent, destroys its autonomy as a political body. This Amendment is in character and 
phraseology precisely similar to the Fifteenth. For each the same method of adoption 
was pursued. One cannot be valid and the other invalid. ' 93 What mattered for the Court 
was again whether the amendment had been proposed and ratified in accordance 
with Article V. And as it had done before, the Court rejected the possibility of an 
unconstitutional constitutional amendment. 
Democracy's core 
There is a deep structural reason why the United States Constitution makes nothing 
unamendable. The intricate design of the separation of powers places significant 
institutional and political barriers along the legislative process. Quite deliberately, this 
makes it difficult to achieve institutional consolidation among the various political 
actors in the branches of government. 94 This uncompromising separation of powers 
and parties mitigates against the peril of parliamentary majoritarianism,95 where the 
governing majority can generally do what it pleases.96 In the American model 
of presidentialism, institutional consolidation behind an amendment requires an 
extraordinary convergence of preferences. That this is difficult to do makes consolidation 
worthy of deference when it is achieved. (The separation of powers in the United States 
therefore assuages the concern that animated the rise of the basic structure doctrine in 
India, where an amendment may be achieved with few exceptions by a parliamentary 
majority alone.) Successfully navigating the political process in the United States leads 
90 William L Marbury, 'The Nineteenth Amendment and After' (1920) 7 Virginia Law Review 1, 2-3, 
28-29. 
91 Everett P Wheeler, 'Limit of Power to Amend Constitution' (1921) 7 American Bar Association 
Journa/75, 78. 
92 Geo Stewart Brown, 'The Amending Clause Was Provided for Changing, Limiting, Shifting or 
Delegating "Powers of Government." It Was Not Provided for Amending "The People." The Amendment is 
Therefore Ultra Vires' (1922) 8 Virginia Law Review 237, 239-41. 
93 Leser v Garnett, [1922] 258 US 130, 136. 
94 Daryl J Levinson and Richard H Pildes, 'Separation of Parties, Not Powers' (2006) 119 Harvard Law 
Review 2311,2330-47. 
95 Robert J Lipkin, 'The New Majoritarianism' (2000) 69 University of Cincinnati Law Review 107, 149. 
96 Richard Albert, 'The Fusion ofPresidentialism and Parliamentarism' (2009) 57 American Journal of 
Comparative Law 531, 562-64. 
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systems', to make 
Constitution is 
it 'is sacredly obligatory .106 The message here is plain but powerful: whether 
the choices the people make are good or bad, choices demand fidelity until they 
change their view. 
It is not actual choice-yea or ·nay, one or the other-that 1natters, however. 
matters is the very act of choosing the way the choice is reached. The 
Constitution makes no judgment about whether a choice is politically right or wrong; it 
assesses only whether the choice conforms to the legal process that the constitutional 
text requires for it to have been made at The Supreme Court confirmed this fact of 
the United States Constitution a much earlier time, observing of the slave trade 
clause, census-based taxation, the Equal Senate Suffrage clause 'right or wrong 
politically, no one can deny that the constitution is supreme.' 107 If popular choices like 
97 Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Faith (PUP 1988) 64. 
98 Richard H Fallon, Jr, 'Legitimacy and the Constitution' (2005) 118 Harvard Law Review 1787, 
1794-1801. 
99 Charles M Freeland, 'The Political Process as Final Solution' (1993) 68 Indianq Law Journal 525, 
526-27. 
100 See eg Sanford Levinson, Our Undemocratic Constitution (OUP 2006) 21; Arend Lijphart, Patterns 
of Democracy (Yale University Press 1999) 220; Astrid Lorenz, 'How to Measure Constitutional Rigidity' 
(2005) 17 Journal of Theoretical Politics 339, 358-59. 
101 Louis Fisher, Constitutional Dialogues: Interpretation as Political Process (PUP 1988) 201-204. 
102 See Wayne Franklin, 'The US Constitution and the Textuality of American Culture' in Vivien Hart 
and Shannon C Stimson (eds), Writing a National Identity: Political, Economic, and Cultural Perspectives 
on the Written Constitution (Manchester University Press 1993) 10. 
103 Thomas Paine, Rights of Man (Hypatia Bradlaugh Bonner ed, Watts & Co 1910) 98. 
104 Beau Breslin, 'Is There a Paradox in Amending a Sacred Text?' (2009) 69 Maryland Law Review 
66, 72. Although it may have been the intention at the time of its design, the Constitution cannot today be 
described as formally flexible. 
105 Horace Binney, An Inquiry into the Formation of Washington s Farewell Address (Parry & McMillan 
1859) 215. 
106 ibid. 
107 Dodge v Woolsey, [1856] 59 US 331, 348. 
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those are acceptable, we can conclude· only that rather than privileging substantive 
outcomes the Constitution hoists above all else no!ms of legal process and procedure. 108 
Perhaps, then, the most appropriate way to frame the concept of popular choice in 
the United States is to understand that it is anchored in the procedural value of outcome 
neutrality. 109 Under the United States Constitution, no end supported by popular consent 
is foreclosed because legitimacy is defined by how not what the people choose. 110 If the 
requisite number of political actors expresses its will according to the rules of Article V, 
the constitutional culture of self-government in the United States dictates that its will be 
done. That is both the origin and the continuing source of the legitimacy of the 
Constitution. Indeed, the predicate of Article V is that legitimacy derives from the act of 
successfully assembling the requisite supermajorities to amend the text. Successfully 
amending the Constitution requires such an overwhelming aggregation of political and 
popular will that it makes the very fact of agreement the reason why we accept as valid 
all changes to the constitutional text. 111 It is not the agreement itself but more specifically 
the difficulty of securing that agreement that breathes legitimacy into the resulting 
amendment. 112 
First Amendment democratic rights 
Popular choice, however, is not an expressly entrenched constitutional right nor would 
it be self-executing even if it were. It emanates from what the Griswold Court might 
have called the 'penumbra' of the various democratic rights entrenched in the 
Constitution, and more specifically in the Bill of Rights. 113 But among those democratic 
rights, the First Amendment's outcome-neutrality and robust protections for the exercise 
of democracy double as guarantors of popular choice. For a Constitution that makes no 
unalterable pre-commitment to substantive values, this feature is indispensable because 
outcome-neutrality facilitates the expression and aggregation of popular choice. The 
paradox of the United States Constitution, then, is that in order for it to cohere internally 
as a charter that is freely amendable as a reflection of the prevailing views of political 
108 Akhil Reed Amar, 'Civil Religion and Its Discontents' (1989) 67 Texas Law Review 1153, 1164-65. 
A recent article takes the view that the Supreme Court's reading of the Constitution as 'neutral' in this sense 
is only a modem development. See Or Bassok, 'The Court Cannot Hold' (2014) 30 Journa{oj Law and 
Politics 1, 34-35. 
109 Akhil Reed Amar, 'Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside Article V' (1988) 55 
University of Chicago Law Review 1043, 1044 n 1. 
11o The Federalist No 46 (James Madison) (JacobE Cooke ed, Wesleyan University Press 1961) 315 
(defending the proposition that 'ultimate authority, wherever the derivative may be found, resides in the 
people alone'). 
111 Brannon P Denning and John R Vile, 'The Relevance of Constitutional Amendments: A Response to 
David Strauss' (2002) 77 Tulane Law Review 247,274. 
112 Michael C Dorf, 'Equal Protection Incorporation' (2002) 88 Virginia Law Review 951, 987. 
113 Griswold v Connecticut, [1965] 381 US 479, 484. 
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actors and the public, whatever those views may be, we must interpret the Constitution 
as implicitly making the First Amendment's democratic rights formally unamendable. 114 
The First Amendment states that 'Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and 
to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. ' 115 In order to remain consistent 
according to its own terms, the First Amendment's democratic rights must be afforded 
special deference and treated as implicitly unamendable. That is not to suggest that the 
First Amendment's democratic rights are or should be eternal, even in the face of 
revolution. Unamendability, whether formal or informal, is defenceless against any 
effort to create a new constitutional regime. But unamendability can be enforced within 
an existing, legally continuous regime where political actors operate by the textual rules 
of legal change. 
The distinction between legally continuous and discontinuous change returns us to 
our earlier discussion on amendment and revision. 116 In his study of Article V, John 
Rawls inquires whether it is 'sufficient for the validity of an amendment that it be 
enacted by the procedure of Article V?' 117 Rawls rejects the formalist view, most 
effectively advocated by John Vile, 118 that there are no substantive limits to formal 
amendment under the United States Constitution. Rawls suggests that the Supreme 
Court could follow the Indian model of judicial review to invalidate a constitutional 
amendment that had satisfied all of the procedural strictures of Article V. He bases his 
theory of judicial invalidation of a constitutional amendment on the distinction 
between amendment and revision. The idea of amendment, he explains, entails two 
possibilities. First, as in the case of the Reconstruction Amendments, it is 'to adjust 
basic constitutional values to changing political and social circumstances, or to 
incorporate into the constitution a broader and more inclusive understanding of those 
values.' 119 And second, as illustrated by the Sixteenth Amendment's authorisation to 
Congress to impose an income tax, it is 'to adapt basic institutions in order to remove 
weaknesses that come to light in subsequent constitutional practice.' 120 
Where constitutional change is more significant than these two kinds, the result, 
explains Rawls, is to revise the Constitution, not to amend it In these cases, Rawls 
explains, the Court should defend the Constitution's basic framework and presuppositions 
114 The claim here echoes the argument that it would result in more than a mere 'amendment' to the 
Constitution to alter fundamental rights that are essential to democratic self-government See Stephen 
Macedo, Liberal Virtue: Citizenship, Virtue, and Community in Liberal Constitutionalism (Clarendon Press 
1990) 183. 
115 US Const, amend I (1791). 
116 See text accompanying notes 37-65. 
117 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (Columbia University Press 2005) 238. 
118 John Vile, 'The Case Against Implicit Limits on the Constitutional Amending Process' in Sanford 
Levinson ( ed), Responding to Imperfection: The Theory and Practice of Constitutional Amendment (PUP 
1995) 213. 
119 Rawls (n 117). 
120 ibid 239. 
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from alteration by simple amendment. Rawls illustrates his theory with reference to the 
First Amendment. Because its repeal would create a new regime, the Court, he suggests, 
should be prepared to invalidate an amendment repealing or proposing to repeal the First 
Amendment absent the recognition and self-awareness, reflected in special procedures, 
that the people were affecting a revolution-level change: 
The Court could say, then, that an amendment to repeal the First Amendment and replace it with 
its opposite fundamentally contradicts the constitutional tradition of the oldest democratic regime 
in the world. It is therefore invalid .... Should that happen, and it is not inconceivable that the 
exercise of political power might take that turn, that would be constitutional breakdown, or 
revolution in the proper sense, and not a valid amendment of the constitution. The successful 
practice of its ideas and principles over two centuries place restrictions on what can now count as 
an amendment, whatever was true at the beginning. 121 
The view that even a freely amendable constitution requires some minimal 
impairment of the right to constitutional amendment is intriguing in the case of the 
United States.122 Rooted in a revolutionary tradition of popular sovereignty, democratic 
government in the United States rejects unamendable constitutional constraints because 
the constitutional traditions of the polity disclaim the right of one generation to make 
fundamental choices of self-definition for another. 123 Thus the right to popular choice 
-the right of rights, as Jeremy Waldron calls the right to participate124-must itself be 
protected from present and future majorities, even if it is their freely expressed choice 
to waive forever their right to choose. The implicit unamendability of the right to 
popular choice in tum frustrates the 'illegitimate entrenchment of the status quo' .125 
Here, then, the exception to the general rule against unamendability in the United States 
presents itself: the First Amendment's democratic rights must themselves be 
unamendable in order to preserve the free amendability of the United States 
Constitution. 126 Accordingly, we could interpret the First Amendment's democratic 
rights as implicitly entrenched against amendment on the theory that 'constitutional 
rules that disentrench by keeping open the channels of constitutional change must 
themselves be entrenched.' 127 Popular choice, then, entails some unamendable core of 
democratic expression. 128 The challenge of course remains determining what precisely 
this core democratic right requires. 
121 ibid (internal citations omitted). 
122 For a useful discussion, see Samuel Freeman, 'Political Liberalism and the Possibility of a Just 
Democratic Constitution' (1994) 69 Chicago-Kent Law Review 619, 662-67. 
123 Gordon S Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787 (University ofNorth Carolina 
Press 1998) 378-83. · 
124 Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement (OVP 1999) 232 (quoting William Cobbett). 
125 Amar (n 1 09). 
126 This could also entaii the same rule under state constitutions insofar as art V requires states to ratify 
amendments in either conventions or legislatures. 
127 Amar (n 1 09). 
128 Akhil Reed Amar, 'The Consent of the Gove~ed: Constitutional Amendment Outside Article V' 
(1994) 94 Columbia Law Review 457, 505. 
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assigning this power to the legislature would, at the very least, an 
choice because the is more commonly the institution 
authorised to declare an amendment unconstitutional constitutional democracies that 
recognise the concept of an unconstitutional constitutional amendment. 132 In the United 
States, where the power of constitutional review has historically resided courts, 133 
........ "" _ _._...., ...... would dictate that the judiciary possess the power to review constitutional 
mnendments, if the power is to exist at all. 
A constitutional court may review the constitutionality of an amendment on either 
procedural or substantive grounds. 134 A constitutional amendment may be deemed 
procedurally unconstitutional where, for example, it fails to conform to the textual 
strictures on majorities, quorums, sequencing or other requirements on the process by 
which an amendment is proposed, ratified or promulgated. In contrast, an mnendment 
1nay be ruled substantively unconstitutional where its content is judged contrary to an 
explicitly or implicitly unamendable provision. As discussed above, the Supreme Court 
of the United States has rejected challenges to the Eighteenth and Ninet~enth 
129 Conrado Hubner Mendes, 'Judicial Review of Constitutional Amendments in the Brazilian Supreme 
Court' (2005) 17 Florida Journal of International Law 449,455 (exploring the role of the Brazilian Supreme 
Court in interpreting the Brazilian Constitution's 'clausulas petreas '). 
130 US Const, art I, § 1. 
131 Eivind Smith, 'Old and Protected? On the "Supra-Constitutional" Clause in the Constitution of 
Norway' (2011) 44 Israel Law Review 369, 383-87. 
132 See generally Kemal Gozler, Judicial Review of Constitutional Amendments (Ekin Press 2008) 
(identifYing courts in constitutional democracies that possess the power to review the constitutionality of 
constitutional amendments). 
133 
_l\.1arbury v Madison, [1803] 5 US (1 Cranch) 137; Eugene V Rostow, 'The Democratic Character 
of Judicial Review' (1952) 66 Harvard Law Review 193, 195-96. For a study of the pre-constitutional roots 
of judicial review, see Mary S Bilder, 'The Corporate Origins of Judicial Review' (2006) 116 Yale Law 
Journal 502. 
134 For illustrations of each, consider the Turkish Constitutional Court, which has invalidated 
amendments on both procedural and substantive grounds. See Aharon Barak, 'Unconstitutional 
Constitutional Amendments' (2011) 44 Israel Law Review 321, 322-25. 
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Amendments, and in doing so appears to have refused to recognise the possibility of an 
unconstitutional constitutional amendment with respect to the substance of an 
amendment. But in its review of constitutional amendments, the Court appears to have 
remained open to the possibility of invalidating an amendment on the basis of its 
procedural failure or irregularity. 135 
The Court has heard at least five cases in. which it has reviewed, on procedural 
grounds, the constitutionality of a constitutional amendment. In its first decade, the 
Court rejected the argument that a constitutional amendment proposed by Congress, in 
this particular case the Eleventh Amendment, must conform to the Constitution's 
presentment requirement. 136 The president, wrote the Court, 'has nothing to do with the 
proposition, or adoption, or amendments to the Constitution' .137 Later, in denying a 
challenge to the Eighteenth Amendment, the Court held that the Article V requirement 
of two-thirds vote to propose an amendment refers to two-thirds in each house, 
assuming a quorum, and not to two-thirds of the entire composition of the legislature.138 
The Eighteenth Amendment was subsequently once again the subject of a constitutional 
challenge when the Court held that the choice of the method of amendment ratification, 
whether state legislative vote or convention, belongs to Congress exclusively. 139 
The other two cases must be read together. Both concern the matter of 
contemporaneity between proposal and ratification, and ask two questions: first, how 
long is too long between the proposal and ratification of an amendment; and second, 
which institution should judge the adequacy of contemporaneity between proposal and 
ratification? In 1921, the Court rejected the argument that Congress had improperly 
ilnposed a seven-year time limit on states to ratify an amendment proposal.140 The Court 
held Congress could indeed impose a time limit in order to ensure that r·atification is 
'sufficiently contemporaneous in that number of states to reflect the will of the people 
in all sections at relatively the same period, which of course ratification scattered 
through a long series of years would not do. ' 141 Twenty years later in 1939, the Court 
narrowed its holding. The Court held that where Congress has not imposed a time limit 
for states to ratify an amendment proposal, ratification must nonetheless occur 'within 
some reasonable time after the proposal' 142 and, in the event of disagreement on what is 
reasonable, the view of Congress, not of the Court, governs. 143 Thus the Twenty-Seventh 
135 One scholar has argued that the Court should assert the power to police the formal rules of art V. See 
Walter Dellinger, 'The Legitimacy of Constitutional Change: Rethinking the Amendment Process' (1983) 97 
Harvard Law Review 386, 432. 
136 Hollingsworth v Virginia, [1798] 3 US (3 Dallas) 378. 
137 ibid 382. 
138 National Prohibition Cases (n 83). 
139 United States v Sprague, [1931] 282 US 716, 730. 
140 Dillon v Gloss, [1921] 256 US 368. 
141 ibid 375. . 
142 Coleman v Miller, [1939] 307 US 433, 452. 
143 ibid. That Coleman was decided only by a plurality has raised doubts about .its precedential value. 
See Michael Stokes Paulsen, 'A General Theory of Article V: The Constitutional Lessons of the Twenty-
Seventh Amendment' (1993) 103 Yale Law Journal 677; 718-21. 
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Amendment, which had been proposed in 1789 but not ratified until two centuries later 
1992, was unopposed by Congress at the of its ratification, 144 its procedural 
regularity was defended by the Department of Justice, 145 and a federal court refused to 
hear a challenge to its constitutionality. 146 
Interpreting First Amendment democratic rights as implicitly entrenched against 
mnendment would therefore require the Court to exercise the power to review 
constitutional amendments on substantive grounds, a power that the Court has 
historically rejected. In light of the extraordinary nature of this power in a constitutional 
democracy as well as the United States Supreme Court's expressed reluctance to invoke 
it, there are two questions in need of answers: first, can we justify, on democratic bases, 
conferring this vast power upon the Court; and, second, can there be a democratic form 
of judicial review of constitutional amendments? 
On the first question, I concede that I do not have what I consider to be ,a winning 
answer, which is why I have long held the contrary view. 147 For the purposes of this 
Article, however, I presuppose an answer for the sake of argument. The answer, if a 
satisfactory one exists, would distinguish between constituent and constituted powers, 
and within constituent powers, its original and derived forms. 148 On this theory, the 
Court's role is to enforce the limits of unamendability imposed by the original 
constituent power, and judges may therefore invalidate a constitutional amendment that 
changes the essential nature of constitution that the original constituent powyr had 
authorised, and that the constituent power alone can change. 149 We could build an 
argument that this is a democratically legitimate judicial role in light of the constituent 
power's implicit entrenchment of First Amendment democratic rights against 
amendment. 150 
144 PaulE McGreal, 'There is no Such Thing as Textualism: A Case Study in Constitutional Method' 
(2001) 69 Fordham Law Review 2393, 2431. 
145 Memorandum Opinion for Counsel to the President, 16 Op Off Legal Counsel 87 (November 2, 
1992). 
146 See Boehner v Anderson, [1992] 809 F Supp 138 (DDC). 
147 Albert (n 1); Albert (n 2); Albert (n 3). 
148 Yaniv Roznai and Serkan Yolcu, 'An Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendment-The Turkish 
Perspective: A Comment on the Turkish Constitutional Court's HeadscarfDecision' (2012) 10 International 
Journal of Constitutional Law 17 5, 191-94. 
149 ibid. 
150 That the First Amendment was the result of an amendment to the Constitution-and therefore the 
result of proposal and ratification by the constituted power, not by the constituent power-weakens this 
justification. But it can perhaps be redeemed in part or in whole by observing that the textual entrenchment 
of the First Amendment, as part of the Bill of Rights, was a condition to the ratification of the Constitution. 
See Leonard W Levy, Origins of the Bill of Rights (Yale University Press 2001) 1--43; Akhil Reed Amar, 
'The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment' (1992) 101 Yale Law Journalll93, 1202. 
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On the second question-whether in the United States there can be a democratic 
form of judicial review of constitutional amendments that are said to violate First 
Atnendment democratic rights-it is just as difficult to persuade judicial sceptics.151 
One possible answer is to propose a modest form of substantive judicial review in the 
United States that does not extend as far as the Indian Supreme Court's basic structure 
doctrine but that nonetheless authorises the Court to protect the Constitution's implicitly 
unamendable core democratic rights under the First Amendment. This would be a 
middle ground of sorts between what Joel Col6n-Rios has termed strong-form basic 
structure judicial review and conventional strong-form judicial review. 152 
Here, the Supreme Court would be ·operationalising the distinction between 
amendment and revision. The dividing line between the two, for the Court, would be 
the First Amendment's freedom of democratic expression. A constitutional alteration 
that does not affect those implicitly entrenched rights would qualify as a proper 
amendment, provided it conforms to the procedural strictures of Article V. In contrast, 
a constitutional alteration that did indeed violate the First Amendment's implicitly 
entrenched democratic rights would work a revision to the Constitution, and could 
therefore not be accomplished using the constitutional amendment procedures in Article 
V. The role of the Court would be to enforce that distinction in the service of both 
the distinction itself and also of the democratic foundations of the United States 
Constitution. 153 
On this theory of democratic judicial review, it is the Court's role to invalidate an 
amendment to First Amendment democratic rights in order to defend democracy in the 
United States. Defending democracy would entail enforcing the Constitution's 
fundamental presuppositions about the centrality of popular choice-an umbrella of 
rights implicitly protected against amendment by the First Amendment. This would 
create a paradoxical circumstance: in order to preserve the free amendability of the 
Constitution, the Supreme Court would have to interpret and enforce the Constitution as 
implicitly entrenching First Amendment democratic rights against amendment. This 
151 In the United States, where the Constitution is extraordinarily difficult to amend formally, the case 
for judicial review of constitutional amendments is weaker than it is in India, for example, where the formal 
rules of constitutional amendment are, by comparison, much easier to satisfy. The more difficult it is to 
achieve cross-institutional consolidation behind a constitutional amendment, the greater the legitimacy we 
attribute to a successful amendment and, in my view, the lesser the appropriateness of judicial intervention. 
See Albert (n 1) 44-46. 
152 See generally Joel Col6n-Rios, 'ANew Typology of Judicial Review ofLegislation' (2014) 3 Global 
Constitutionalism 14 3 (outlining a five-part typology of judicial review). 
153 The question becomes whether any violation is sufficient to warrant judicial involvement. 
A reasonable way for judges to approach this question, though one that is still difficult to operationalise 
with reliability across time and among· different judges, is to intervene only where the violation would 
amount to a fundamental abandonment of the unamendable right, that is to say a violation that is not a 
mere deviation from the unamendable principle but an attack on it. See Yaniv Roznai, 'Legisprudence 
Limitations on Constitutional Amendments? Reflections on the Czech Constitutional Court's Declaration 
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proposing to shorten the legislative term of office mid-stream of an ongoing term. 154 
The Court explained that the unwritten substantive core of Czech Constitution 
consists of rights values, including popular sovereignty, the right of resistance, 
basic principles of fair election, and the rule of law principles of generality, non-
retroactivity and predictability of law. 155 The Cou1i that the notion of predictability 
in legislative terms was a fundamental feature of democracy under the Czech 
Constitution, a feature that could not be violated by a constitutional amendment, not 
even an amendment that met procedural conditions entrenched in the constitutional 
text. 156 For the Court, this democratic feature was central to the Constitution's identity, 
and the Cotni saw its role as protecting the Constitution's substantive core from attacks 
concealed as constitutional amendments. 157 
The role of the Supreme Court in the United States could be much the same were First 
Amendment democratic rights understood to be implicitly entrenched against 
amendment. The Court would see itself, and it would be seen, as defending the 
unamendable substantive core of the Constitution where it was faced with a challenge 
to a constitutional amendment alleged to impinge on a First Amendment democratic 
right. In theory, then, we can envision how the Court, and indeed all other federal 
courts, would conduct themselves as guardians of the Constitution in a regime with an 
implicitly unamendable constitutional principle, rule, value, structure or institution. In 
reality, however, it is important to inquire how and even whether theory maps onto 
application. 
Consider for example the recently failed Twenty-Eighth Amendment proposal. 
June 2013, Senator Tom Udall proposed an amendment that would have authorised 
154 Kieran Williams, 'When a Constitutional Amendment Violates the 'Substantive Core': The Czech 
Constitutional Court's September 2009 Early Elections Decision' (2011) 36 Review of Central and East 
European Law 33, 42. 
155 ibid 42-43. 
156 ibid 43. 
157 ibid 49-50. 
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Congress and the states to regulate campaign fundraising and expenditures.158 The 
proposal was a direct -response to the Supreme Court's controversial judgment in 
Citizens United v Federal Election Commission, 159 which deregulated much of electoral 
campaign finance. The Court held in Citizens United that Congress may not ban 
corporations and unions from making independent expenditures in connection with an 
election campaign. 160 Udall's amendment proposal was one of several that had been 
introduced to reverse the Court's ruling in Citizens United. 161 But his proposal came 
closer than most others to becoming law, as it was approved for debate in the Senate by 
a vote of 79- 18,162 only to later be defeated by a narrow margin of 54- 42. 163 
This campaign finance amendment proposed to give electoral regulatory powers to 
the legislative branch in both levels of government.164 The stated purpose of the proposal 
was 'to advance the fundamental principle of political equality for all, and to protect the 
integrity of the legislative and electoral processes. n 65 The proposal intended to authorise 
Congress to 'regulate the raising and spending of money and in-kind equivalents with 
respect to Federal elections' 166 including but not limited to imposing limits on 
contributions to candidates in both primary and general elections, and on expenditures 
'by, in support of, or in opposition to such candidates' .167 The proposal also sought to 
give the same powers to states with respect to state elections. 168 Importantly, the 
proposal insisted that 'nothing in this article shall be construed to grant Congress the 
power to abridge the freedom of the press.' 169 
Suppose the Twenty-Eighth Amendment had passed the House, the Senate and 
ultimately been properly ratified by three-quarters of the states, as required by Article V. 
Suppose also that, after failing in the lower federal courts, a plaintiff with standing had 
successfully petitioned the Supreme Court to review the substantive constitutionality of 
the amendment. Suppose further that the First Amendment's democratic rights were 
158 Press Release, 'Udall Introduces Constitutional Amendment on Campaign Finance Reform', Senator 
Tom Udall Official Website, 18 June 2013 <http://www.tomudall.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=1329>. 
159 558 us 310 (2010). 
160 ibid 365-66. 
161 See eg H J Res 31, 113th Cong (2013) (proposing amendment on campaign finance); S J Res 29, 
112th Cong (2011) (same); see also Byron Tau, 'Obama Calls for Constitutional Amendment to Overturn 
Citizens United' Politico, 29 August 2012 <http://www.politico.com/politico44/2012/08/obama-calls-
for-constitutional-amendment-to-overturn-133724.html> (reporting that President Barack Obama urges a 
'serious look at a constitutional amendment to revise the Supreme Court's Citizens United ruling'). 
162 Kathleen Hunger, 'Senate Advances Campaign-Finance Constitutional Amendment', Bloomberg 
News, 9 September 2014 <http:/ /www.bloomberg.com/news/20 14-09-08/senate-advances-campaign-
:finance-constitutional-amendment.html>. 
163 Burgess Everett, 'Senate Blocks Campaign Finance Amendment' Politico, 11 September 2014 
<http://www.politico.com/story/2014/09/senate-block-campaign-finance-amendment-110864.html>. 
164 S J Res 19, 113th Cong (2013). 
165 ibid para 1. 
166 ibid. 
167 ibid paras 1(1)-(2). 
168 ibid para 2. 
169 ibid para 3. 
38 Comparative Perspectives on the Fundamental Freedom of Expression 
generally understood to be implicitly unamendable. Faced with these circumstances, 
would the Court invalidate the amendment today as infringing presently-recognised 
rights of corporations unions to exercise de1nocratic rights? 170 [I use this example 
because of its timeliness, not necessarily because it is the best one analytical 
purposes. better though less timely example would be an amendment prohibiting 
people from burning the American flag.] 
The Court would have at least four options, none of which would be compelled by 
the implicit unamendability of the First Amendment's democratic rights. First, the Court 
could uphold the amendment as a procedurally proper exercise of the amendment power 
conferred upon political actors. Yet the doctrine of unconstitutional constitutional 
amendments precludes such a formalist analysis because the very theory of a 
substantively unconstitutional constitutional amendment presupposes that procedural 
correctness alone is ineffective to shield an amendment from invalidation. Second, the 
Court could theoretically uphold the amendment as substantively constitutional. 
Notwithstanding the currently constituted Court having issued the judgment reversed 
by the amendment, 171 the Court could find a way to construe the amendment as 
consistent with the unamendable First Amendment by carving out an exception to its 
own absolutist language. 
the third and fourth options, respectively, the Court could invalidate the law on 
either procedural or substantive grounds. There being no procedural irregularity in the 
posited counterfactual, what would remain is the fourth option: the possibility of a 
substantively unconstitutional constitutional amendment. Just as the Court could 
construe the First Amendment's implicitly unamendable democratic rights as admitting 
of an exception, it could just as easily interpret those rights as absolutes subject to no 
violation even in exceptional circumstances. In this scenario, the Court would strike 
down the amendment. Yet invalidation strikes me as unlikely in light of the robust 
culture of popular choice the Court would be seeking to vindicate by treating First 
Amendment democratic rights as implicitly unamendable. It would raise too sharp a 
contrast for the Court to recognise on the one hand that the Constitution is anchored in 
popular choice, and therefore requires making First Amendment democratic rights 
implicitly unamendable, and on the other to invalidate an amendment whose intent is to 
create a more egalitarian model of campaign finance and political speech than currently 
exists. 
It is not clear what an unamendable First Amendment would change in the United 
States in terms of interpretation or enforcement, particularly given the politicisation of 
17° Kyle Langvardt, 'Imagine Change Before and After Citizens United' (2012) 3 Alabama Civil Rights 
& Civil Liberties Law Review 227, 241--43 (exploring how corporate and union rights would be violated in 
overruling Citizens United). 
171 However, it would not be unprecedented for a Court to abandon a position on a matter of 
constitutional interpretation that had been repudiated by political actors as well as the public. A prominent 
example is the Court's acquiescence to political and public pressure in the New Deal era. Compare US v 
Darby, [1941] 312 US 100, 123 (overruling Hammer) with Hammer v Dagenhart, [1918] 247 US 251, 273-
74 (distinguishing commerce from manufacturing and prohibiting Congress from regulating manufacturing). 
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the Court, whose c9mposition is often determinative of the outcome. Unamendability 
would not be self-executing in the sense that it would itself bar political actors from 
trying to pass a constitutional amendment that divests or seriously impinges upon First 
Amendment democratic rights. Nothing about explicit or implicit entrenchment against 
amendment dictates the outcome when the entrenched value is interpreted by the 
·ultimate arbiter of constitutionality. And this may in fact be a virtue: the continued 
contestability of constitutional meaning is consistent with popular choice and outcome-
neutrality, two fundamental pillars that support the whole of the Constitution. 
It is true, though, that the very fact of the implicit unamendability could cause 
political actors to pause before acting. Courts, for their part, would have to resolve each 
challenge to the constitutionality of a constitutional amendment in much the same way 
that they today resolve challenges under the First Amendment: with vast powers of 
interpretive and methodological latitude that make it possible to defend any reasonable 
view of the Constitution. (Here, I am assuming that the political actors in the United 
States, now a mature democracy, would not today pass an unreasonable amendment 
that openly and nefariously denies democratic rights to one or more classes of persons.) 
Despite the difficulty of projecting with any assurance how the informal 
entrenchment of the First Amendment's democratic rights would change the Court's 
interpretation of those rights, there is one clear and valuable consequence of implicitly 
recognising the unamendability of First Amendment democratic rights: the expressive 
role that such recognition plays. Scholars have theorised that constitutions express 
values. For instance, they have argued that constitutions may be designed to reflect a 
jurisdiction's constitutional identity, 172 to show how a 'nation goes about defining 
itself', 173 to 'create a shared consciousness' ,174 or to make a statement about a nation's 
objectives and aspirations. 175 Constitutions are commonly designed to reflect these 
values in the preamble176 or elsewhere in the main text. 177 But constitutional designers 
also use unamendability as a way to convey internally and to the wider world the values 
that matter most to their constitutional community. Where constitutional designers 
disable formal amendment rules as to one or more constitutional provisions the message 
172 Gary J Jacobsohn, Constitutional Identity (HUP 2010) 348. 
173 Mark Tushnet, Weak Courts, Strong Rights: Judicial Review and Social Welfare Rights in 
Comparative Constitutional Law (PUP 2009) 12. 
174 Tom Ginsburg, 'Written Constitutions and the Administrative State: On the Constitutional Character 
of Administrative Law' in Susan Rose-Ackerman and Peter L Lindseth (eds), Comparative Administrative 
Law (Edward Elgar 2010) 117, 118. 
175 Cass R Sunstein, 'On the Expressive Function of Law' (1996) 5 East European Constitutional 
Review 66, 67. 
176 See eg France Const., prmbl. (1958) (identifying justice as a constitutional value); Switzerland 
Const, prmbl (1999) (identifying liberty as a constitutional value); Venezuela Const, prmbl (1999) 
(identifying democracy as a constitutional value). 
177 See eg Kazakhstan Const, § I, art 1(1) (1995) (identifying human dignity as a constitutional value); 
South Africa Const, ch 1, § 1 (1996) (identifying the rule oflaw as a constitutional value); Spain Const, art 1 
(1978) (identifying secularism as a constitutional value). 
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The degree to which a constitutional provision is insulated from formal amendment and from the 
unpredictability of constitutional politics is in this case a proxy for preference. The stricter its 
entrenchment, the higher the constitutional worth of a given provision. Absolute entrenchment 
against formal amendment is thus the strongest statement of a provision's value. 178 
Recognizing First Amendment's 
rights may therefore be useful even where enforcement of 
unamendability risks being both unreliable ineffective. Perhaps, then, the best 
function of unamendability of the First Amendment's democratic rights is 
to express what is most valued in the constitutional culture of the United States. The 
expressive function of unamendability is, my view, more compelling where 
inviolability of the protected value is textually entrenched than where the inviolability 
of the value is rooted only in a judicial opinion. Nonetheless, the judicial recognition of 
the centrality of the First Amendment's democratic rights-even where the Court's 
interpretation of those rights is contestable-would convey their special importance in 
the United States. 
I began with a challenge: does the United States Constitution make anything 
unamendable? We know that nothing in its text is today formally unamendable. the 
question remains whether the Constitution could be interpreted as requiring some form 
of unamendability in order to survive according to its own terms. I suggested that we 
could understand the Constitution and its political and judicial evolution over time as 
requiring First Amendment democratic rights to be implicitly unamendable. 179 This, 
I argued, is a great paradox of the United States Constitution: in order for it to cohere 
internally as a freely amendable social contract, we must interpret it as implicitly 
making the First Amendment's democratic rights formally unamendable, and 
consequently restricting in this narrow but important way the fundamental democratic 
right of constitutional amendment. I suggested a modest form of substantive judicial 
review and questioned whether it could be an effective way of enforcing these implicitly 
unamendable democratic rights. My sceptical posture unamendability persuaded 
me that the answer was unclear at best, though I closed by recognising the value of 
unamendability, both formal and informal, its expressive 
178 Albert (n 34) 254. 
179 An equally useful approach would not ask whether the First Amendment is implicitly unamendable, 
but whether in the First Amendment's absence from the constitutional text the Supreme Court would find the 
democratic rights it entrenches nonetheless implied. The High Court of Australia, for example, has found an 
implied right to political expression where the constitutional text entrenches no such right. See Australian 
Capital Television, [1992] HCA 45; [1992] 177 CLR 106. 
